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Abstract 
Background: Asymmetric information is one of the most important issues in insurance market which occurred 
due to inherent characteristics of one of the agents involved in insurance contracts; hence its management 
requires designing appropriate policies. This phenomenon can lead to the failure of insurance market via its two 
consequences, namely, adverse selection and moral hazard. 
Objective: This study was aimed to evaluate the status of asymmetric information in Iran’s health insurance 
market with respect to the demand for outpatient services. 
Materials/Patients and Methods: This research is a cross sectional study conducted on households living in 
Iran. The data of the research was extracted from the information on household’s budget survey collected by the 
Statistical Center of Iran in 2012. In this study, the Generalized Method of Moment model was used and the 
status of adverse selection and moral hazard was evaluated through calculating the latent health status of 
individuals in each insurance category. To analyze the data, Excel, Eviews and stata11 software were used. 
Results: The estimation of parameters of the utility function of the demand for outpatient services (visit, 
medicine, and Para-clinical services) showed that households were more risk averse in the use of outpatient care 
than other goods and services. After estimating the health status of households based on their health insurance 
categories, the results showed that rural-insured people had the best health status and people with supplementary 
insurance had the worst health status. In addition, the comparison of the conditional distribution of latent health 
status approved the phenomenon of adverse selection in all insurance groups, with the exception of rural 
insurance. Moreover, calculation of the elasticity of medical expenses to reimbursement rate confirmed the 
existence of moral hazard phenomenon. 
Conclusions: Due to the existence of the phenomena of adverse selection and moral hazard in most of health 
insurances categories, policymakers need to adjust contracts so that to reduce these phenomena. Given the 
importance of financing, the presence of such problems can lead to less coverage of health insurance provided by 
insurers, loss of contracts with health care institutions and service providers, and lower quality of health services. 
Keywords: adverse selection, asymmetric information, moral hazard 
1. Introduction 
The phenomenon of asymmetric information due to insured’s extrinsic and inherent properties as one of the 
agents involved in insurance contracts and requires designing appropriate policies. Lack of ability to recognize 
Insured people with various risks can pave the way for the development of adverse selection, which is one of the 
consequences of asymmetric information. Although several mechanisms are used by health Insurance 
organizations to assess the health status of the population, information asymmetric may still occur. Moral hazard 
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is another clear indication of asymmetric information which occurs when there is a level of uncertainty with 
regard to some variables such as requesting unnecessary medical services (Resende & Zeidan, 2010).  
The topics of asymmetric information, adverse selection, and moral hazard in the insurance literature are rooted 
in researches done by Arrow, Pauli and Rothschild et al. These subjects were first proposed by the economists 
(Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1974; Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976). 
The models of adverse selection and moral hazard indicate the positive relationship between risk and demand for 
insurance (Doiron, Jones, & Savage, 2008). Adverse selection will emerge when insured people have some 
information about their risks which are not known by insurers; in such cases insured people use this type of 
information to buy insurance (Cohen & Siegelman, 2010).  
Most of the theoretical works in the field of insurance show that asymmetric information lead to the provision of 
inadequate insurance services or even the failure of the insurance market. In the traditional theory of demand for 
services, there are several hypotheses that lead to adverse selection that one of them is the existence of 
asymmetric information (Gh Mahdavi & Izadi, 2012; Ghadir Mahdavi & Rinaz, 2006). Its’ outcomes can 
potentially increase the use of medical services, affect on consumption behaviors of individuals, and ultimately 
increase health expenditure (Abolhallaje et al., 2013). 
During the last decade, the growth of inflation in health care costs in the United States of America has been more 
than the consumer price index and a high percentage of its Gross domestic product (GDP) has been devoted to 
health expenditure; some researchers believe that such an inflation is rooted in the deviations in health care 
Insurance market (Bajari, Hong, & Khwaja, 2006). During the same period, Iran has also experienced a growth 
in health expenses compared with other consumer costs (Haddad & Anbaji, 2010). 
The lack of sufficient information about the health status and heavy burden of medical expenses are part of the 
reasons for this deviation in health insurance market. The lack of information on the Latent health status of 
population leads to adverse selection; moreover, the burden of medical expenses is due to the phenomenon of 
moral hazard (Liu, Nestic, & Vukina, 2012). 
Given the fact that the insured people do not directly pay for all medical costs while receiving medical care 
services, a high share of medical costs is paid by Insurance institutions. Therefore they don’t have any 
motivation to limit their consumption and will cause inflation in health expenditure (Cutler & Zeckhauser, 2000). 
More than half of the insured people who are under the coverage of employer sponsored insurances in the USA, 
have the chance to choose plans that are different in terms of generosity from among competing plans for health 
Insurance (Tchernis, Normand, Pakes, Gaccione, & Newhouse, 2006). 
Even though the competition between the various insurance institutions can reduce the insurance costs and can 
fulfill heterogeneous needs of consumers, it can exacerbate adverse selection. Usually people with more severe 
health conditions choose plans that are more generous. This situation leads to welfare losses resulting from the 
financial inability of insurance companies against future risks, and it may even limit insurance contracts while 
people demand to buy insurance (Rothschild & Stiglitz, 1976).  
In addition, determining similar and uniform premium fee independent of risk in insurance plans for health 
services is accepted as a part of "managed competition"; it is not consistent with the condition of optimality in 
insurance contracts at the presence of moral hazard; hence risk-based premiums should be considered as an 
alternative (Zweifel & Breuer, 2006). 
1.1 Relationship to the Literature 
Different studies have been conducted on the adverse selection and moral hazard in different countries. Bajari et 
al. used a semi-parametric approach to address these issues in different insurance groups in the USA; their 
results showed that individuals under the coverage of Medicare insurance had worse health status than other 
insured people, and the lowest risk was related to persons with self-employed insurance. Moreover, the 
distribution of health status among the uninsured people was significantly different from other people under the 
coverage of different classes of insurance. Further moral hazard test showed that the people covered by Medicare 
had no significant difference with the uninsured people; it shows that this type of insurance had better 
reimbursement plans which improved the consumption behavior of insured people under its’ coverage (Bajari et 
al., 2006). 
Mahdavi et al. assessed the status of adverse selection in supplementary insurance markets in Tehran (Iran). They 
used two logistic regression models to assess the impact of individuals’ characteristics on the purchase of 
supplementary insurance plans; finally, because of the relationship between the claim occurrence and the 
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decision to buy insurance, they proved the existence of adverse selection in the market (Gh Mahdavi & Izadi, 
2012).  
In the same way, Marquis and Philips also evaluated the adverse selection in health supplementary insurance 
markets. Using probit regression model, they examined the effects of the price of insurance, expected medical 
expenses, and other factors on the decision to buy supplementary insurance plans. Their results showed a 
considerable demand for supplementary insurance plans even after the elimination of the current subsides which 
usually leads to a decrease in demand (Marquis & Phelps, 1987).   
Moreover, Kang et al. assessed the effect of private health insurance on medical visits in Korea using a probit 
model; the results showed that people with private health insurance were 14 percent more likely to refer to 
physicians than those without this type of insurance. They believed, private insurance in Korea had the potential 
to create moral hazard (Kang, You, Kwon, & Oh, 2009). 
Pylypchuk studied the effect of health insurance on the use of prescribed drugs in different types of patients and 
the results showed that, in comparison with uninsured people and those who were insured but did not have a 
coverage for drugs, insured persons who had drug coverage in their Insurance plan were more prone to use more 
medication and medical services than (Pylypchuk, 2010).  
Despite the results of the above mentioned studies, the results of a study by Cardon et al. conducted on the 
effects of adverse selection on the costs and utilization of medical services in the health insurance market, 
showed no evidence of adverse selection in health insurance markets (Cardon & Hendel, 2001).  
Paccagnella studied the voluntary private health insurance among people aged 50 years old in 11 European 
countries and showed that insurers had been able to control moral hazard and adverse selection by taking into 
account the cost- sharing for every individuals; this led to a situation in which the people in all of these countries, 
except for the Netherlands, paid more out of pocket payment (Paccagnella, Rebba, & Weber, 2013).   
By measuring moral hazard and adverse selection in Hong Kong, Wong found no evidences for the excessive 
demand for services among those who self purchased insurance plans. Hence, the assumption of the existence of 
adverse selection in the use of public hospital services for this group of people was rejected (Wong et al., 2010). 
1.2 The Iranian Health Insurance Market 
In Iran, many organizations provide health insurance services both in two forms of basic and supplementary 
insurance plans. In the field of basic insurance, four main institutions are in charge of the provision of such basic 
services. In 2012, about half of the population of the country was under the coverage of insurance services 
provided by the Social Security Organization (SSO) which was the largest share among all the involved 
organizations. Generally, people who are covered by this insurance organization have either compulsory or 
voluntary insurance. The Medical Service Insurance Organization (MSIO) is another insurance organization that 
widely provides coverage for a large population in Iran. This organization is in charge of providing insurance 
coverage for government employees, rural people, students, and other segments of the community. The Military 
Personnel Insurance Organization provides the insurance services for armed forces and their families. Imam 
Khomeini Relief Foundation (IKRF) is also another institution which covers poor people, people with disabilities, 
and orphans; compared with the three above mentioned entities it covers a smaller population. In addition to 
these institutions, there are several insurance funds which provide their Insurance services only to their own 
employees and their families (Abolhallaje & Tahereh, 2013; Davari, Haycox, & Walley, 2012).   
In Iran, people are forced to choose basic insurance based on their occupation and they have no choice to choose 
their basic insurance; they can only accept or refuse to register for a supplementary insurance plan. Hence, given 
the importance of health Insurance plans, this study was aimed to evaluate the status of asymmetric information 
in Iran’s health insurance market via testing its two main outcomes i.e. adverse selection and moral hazard. 
2. Materials and Methods 
This research is a cross sectional study conducted on households living in Iran. It was carried out via the 
following steps. 
2.1 First Step: Specifying and Estimating the Utility Function 
Given the fact that, every individual manages its own medical consumption on the basis of the type of insurance 
and information about its own health status, hence a level of medical services is consumed whose utility is 
maximized regarding to health status and the use of a composite commodity. Like Bajari et al. first we specified 
the consumer utility function as ܷሺܿ,݉ െ ߠ; ߛሻ, where c is the household consumption of composite commodity, 
m is the consumption of medical services, θ is the latent health status of the individual that is invisible to insurer, 
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and γ is utility function parameter (Bajari et al., 2006). Therefore, the use of medical services can be considered 
as a substitute for the poor health condition (Cardon & Hendel, 2001). In this function, m and θ are assumed to 
be in the form of monetary units and only their difference is entered in the utility function. Finally, the above 
mentioned utility function is considered as a separable function with the following form; it also shows the budget 
constraint that each household faces to. 
  ܷሺܿ,݉ െ ߠ; ߛሻ ൌ ଵଵିఊభ ܿ
ଵିఊభ ൅ ംమభషംయሺ௠ିఏሻభషംయ                             (1) 
s.t: ܿ ൌ ݕ െ ݌ െ ݖሺ݉ሻ 
The above utility function also shows the parameters of risk aversion for the consumption of composite 
commodity and medical services. In the above mentioned budget constraint, y represents the total household 
expenditures, p is the premium, and z(m) is out of pocket payments spent by households. Hence, insured 
households pay only part of the total costs and m-z(m) reimbursed by insurance institutions. Given that the 
reimbursed plans by insurance companies do not relate directly to the latent health status of an individual and is 
only a function of the amount of the consumption of medical services (m), this leads to moral hazard. Therefore, 
individuals consume a level of medical services which maximizes their utility with respect to its own health. 
Accordingly, as the health status becomes worse, there would be higher tendency to use more medical services. 
As a result, first order condition is as follows: 
                          ܷ௠ሺܿ,݉ െ ߠ; ߛሻെ ௖ܷሺܿ,݉ െ ߠ; ߛሻൣݖ௠′ ൧ ൌ 0                            (2) 
In the first equation, based on the marginal rate of substitution law, people choose a level of medical services 
which maximize the utility on the basis of their current insurance status. This low is based on the allocation of 
budget between medical services and composite commodity and it states that the ratio of marginal utility of both 
commodities with respect to the relative prices should be equal. Hence the optimal condition is as follows and 
the equation is used to estimate the model: 
        ߛଶሺ݉ െ ߠሻିγయ ൌ ܥିγభ൫ݖ௠′ ൯                               (3) 
Where,  z୫′  is the rate of out of pocket payments that the rate for outpatients’ services is equal to 1 for 
uninsured people and 0.3 for insured people in all insurance categories in Iran. Therefore: 
                              zො ′ሺm, dሻ ൌ ൜				1,																		if									d ൌ 1	0.3,																if								d ൌ 0                           (4) 
Where d = 1 is representative of uninsured people and d = 0 indicated different insured groups. Given the values 
for different parameters of utility function for each individual, latent health status can be obtained via calculating 
consumption of medical services by using optimality condition in Equation 3. Therefore: 
                 ߠ ൌ ߮ሺm୧, p୧, y୧, zොሺm୧, d୧ሻ, ߛሻ                               (5) 
And the explicit form of this function, assuming that m≥0, is as follows: 
߮ሺm୧, p୧, y୧, zොሺm୧, d୧ሻ, ߛሻ ൌ m୧ െ ቄ ଵఊమ ൫y୧ െ p୧ െ zොሺm୧, d୧ሻ൯
ିγభ	zො′ሺm୧, d୧ሻቅ
షభ
γయ                (6) 
2.2 Second step: Estimating the Model 
Firstly, using a semi-parametric approach, the parameters of utility function (ߛ) were estimated. For this 
estimation, generalized method of movement model was used. As a positive feature of this model, it does not 
need to apply the parametric assumptions about the distribution of the parameters. Thus, latent health status can 
be determined through using optimality conditions in equation 3. Also, the risk aversion parameters of the utility 
function can be estimated. Thus, it is very important to correctly specify the consumer utility function and utilize 
the economic assumption of maximum utility. The method also uses a series of instrumental variables that are 
independent of the individuals’ latent health status and only show the exogenous variations among different 
health insurance plans. 
2.3 Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard Test 
Following bajari et al. to conduct adverse selection test, we used the conditional distribution of the latent health 
status in each of the classes of insurance with respect to the distribution of latent health status. Using 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, the health status of individuals at different insurance classes was compared.  
To perform moral hazard test, we used the estimated parameters of the utility function and the distribution of 
latent health status to estimate the elasticity of total medical expenses with regard to the amount of 
reimbursement. The calculated elasticity shows the percentage of changes in the demand for medical services 
with regard to the percentage of changes in reimbursed rate by Insurance institutions. This method of moral 
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hazard measurement reflects the changes in consumer behavior with respect to the change in reimbursement 
policies. Therefore, the distribution of elasticity for each household is calculated by the following equation. 
δ௠೔
δ௭೘೔′
ൈ ݖ௠೔
′
݉௜ ൌ
ߛଵܿ௜ିఊభିଵ݉௜ݖ௠೔′ െ ܿ௜ିఊభ
ߛଵܿ௜ିఊభିଵݖ௠೔′ଶ ൅ ߛଶߛଷሺ݉௜ െ ߠ௜ሻିఊయିଵ െ ܿ௜ିఊభ
ൈ ݖ௠೔
′
݉௜  
2.4 Data 
The required data was extracted from household budget questionnaire run by the Statistical Center of Iran in 
2012. Each observation shows the information about the amount of out-patients services including visits, 
Para-clinical services, and medicine consumption. The sample consisted of 34,023 households. Our focus was on 
the types of insurance. The data consisted of a set of socio-economic variables (such as age, gender, education, 
household size, income deciles, income and expenses), information about the insurance (including premium, 
insurance type), and finally the variables related to the utilization of outpatient services (OOP payments by 
households for outpatient services and amount of reimbursement paid by institutions under contract). Excel 
software was used to refine the data and then stata11 and Eviews software were used to estimate model 
parameters. 
2.5 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
The questionnaires which satisfied the requirements of the budget constraint in the utility function were entered 
into the analysis process and the rest of data was excluded from the study. Taking into account the budget 
constraint, 57 cases which were not satisfied the budget constraint function were excluded and 33966 households 
were analyzed. 
3. Results 
The distribution of data showed that, of the 33,966 households that were analyzed, 9,464 were insured by the 
Social Security Organization (SSO) of whom a total of 5,444 had compulsory employee-employer insurance and 
the rest were self-insured (voluntary). In addition, 11,843 households were under the coverage of rural insurance; 
moreover, 3,707 households were officially-insured that both were covered by The Medical Service Insurance 
Organization (MSIO). A total of 1892 households had supplementary insurance and 511 households covered by 
other public institutions. Also 6549 were not covered by any type of insurance.  
The result of estimating the parameters of the utility function is shown in Table 1. As the t-statistic shows, all 
these parameters are statistically significant at the 0.01 level. Also, j-statistics indicates instrumental variables 
including household size, number of literate family members, and the premium met our expectations regarding 
the parameters of the utility function. These instrument variables haven’t any correlation with latent health status 
and only reflect exogenous changes. Moreover, the assumption of normality of the data was confirmed using 
normality test. The risk aversion index ߛଷ was 0.767 for health care consumption (visits, medicine, and 
Para-clinical services) and ߛଵ was 0.037 for the composite commodities which suggest that people are more risk 
averse in utilizing medical goods than composite commodities. Moreover, the value of ߛଶ  also shows 
individuals put more emphasis and weight on the consumption of medical services. 
 
Table 1. Estimation of the parameters of the utility function (risk aversion parameters for the utilization of 
medical services and composite commodities) using generalized method of movement 
γ3 γ2 γ1 Characteristics 
0.767806 73.58 0.037157 Value 
80.66861 3.065228 12.58375 t-Statistic 
0.0000 0.0022 0.0000 Prob. 
J-statistic: 2.11E-05, R-squared, 0.141281. 
 
In addition, Arro-Prat risk aversion index was calculated for different income categories; Table 2 shows the level 
of this index for different income categories. As the table shows, the higher the amount of income has the lower 
the degree of risk aversion. 
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Table 2. Arro-Prat risk aversion based on the income category 
Income group Average Minimum Maximum 
Docile 1 1.38E-06 6.27E-07 3.97E-06 
Docile 2 1.35E-06 6.26E-07 3.74E-06 
Docile 3 1.33E-06 6.22E-07 3.71E-06 
Docile 4 1.32E-06 6.15E-07 3.91E-06 
Docile 5 1.23E-06 6.15E-07 3.58E-06 
Docile 6 1.12E-06 5.97E-07 3.55E-06 
Docile 7 1.15E-06 6.07E-07 3.59E-06 
Docile 8 1.07E-06 6.09E-07 3.51E-06 
Docile9 1.07E-06 6.09E-07 3.87E-06 
Docile 10 9.44E-07 5.84E-07 3.52E-06 
 
After estimating the parameters of the utility function, the latent health status was calculated (using Equation 4). 
Overall, the mean latent health status was 87 114.72 Iran Rail (Each US dollars equals 12260 Iran Rails in 2012) 
and the results showed that, from the perspective of insurance institutions, rural-insured’s households had the 
best health status and individuals with supplementary insurance had the worst health status. The health status in 
terms of monetary units (Iran Rail) is presented in Table 4 for all the households based on their insurance 
categories. 
 
Table 3. Distribution of health status among different insurance classes and uninsured people 
Insurance category Covered by Mean Minimum Maximum 
Uninsured - 64 968.96 -261 769 26 765 601 
Employee-employer insurance 
SSO 
100 400.4 -1 254 833 1.51E+08 
Self-insured insurance 280 782.3 -1 263 548 82 263 195 
Officially- insured insurance 
MISO 
273 618.9 -1 260 580 1.15E+08 
Rural insurance -161 737 -1 295 434 56 818 300 
Other public institution insurance Other institution 322 953.7 -1 227 236 1.59E+08 
Supplementary insurance Public & private Co. 842638 -1252285 2.19E+08 
 
To examine the two outcomes of asymmetric information i.e. adverse selection and moral hazard we used the 
conditional distribution test of Kolmogorov-Smirnov. To evaluate the status of adverse selection, we calculated 
the latent health status of the household to test the null hypothesis which suggested the equal distribution of 
households’ latent health status among different insurance classes. The results of the comparison for different 
classes of insurance are shown in Table 4. Considering the test statistic, the null hypothesis, which suggested the 
equal distribution between the uninsured people and the different insurance classes, was rejected; it showed that 
there is adverse selection in health insurance markets is Iran. 
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Table 4. Results of the distribution of latent health status calculated by Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
6 5 4 3 2 1 Insurance category 
0.5455(0.000) 0.6753(0.000) 0.6923(0.000) 0.6285(0.000) 0.5985(0.000) 0.662(0.000) 0 
0.1262(0.000) 0.2572(0.000) 0.1487(0.000) 0.0391(0.000) 0.0823(0.000)  1 
0.0790 (0.000) 0.1759 (0.000) 0.0983 (0.000) 0.0769 (0.000)   2 
0.0921 (0.000) 0.2394 (0.000) 0.1523(0.000)    3 
0.1635 (0.000) 0.1198 (0.000)     4 
0.2009 (0.000)      5 
Insurance categories: 0= uninsured, 1= Employee-employer, 2=Self-insured, 3=officially- insured, 4= Rural-insured, 5= other 
public institution, 6= Supplementary.  
 
Moreover, Table 5 presents the price elasticity of demand for medical services with regard to the amount of out 
of pocket payments among different insurance classes. As indicated by the mean elasticity values, among 
different insurance classes, the minimum and maximum amount of elasticity were observed in people with 
supplementary insurance and people insured by other public institutions, respectively. 
 
Table 5. Elasticity index classified by different insurance category and uninsured people 
Insurance category Mean Minimum Maximum 
Uninsured -2.45862 -81.886933 -0.02716089 
Employee-employer insurance -3.49835 -154.84001 -0.01571567 
Self-insured insurance -3.04765 -120.56442 -0.04041747 
Officially- insured insurance -3.43166 -228.32415 -0.01624222 
Rural insurance -3.77396 -115.41573 -0.03899935 
Other public institution insurance -3.88417 -97.135432 -0.04054852 
Supplementary insurance -2.74799 -93.808648 -0.00899122 
 
The results of Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, which was conducted to check the conditional distribution of elasticity, 
showed that the phenomenon of moral hazard was observed in all insured individuals; the severity of moral 
hazard in people who were insured by other public institutions was more than the other groups. Therefore, with 
regard to Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and the comparing of elasticity value between uninsured people with insured 
people in each category, we can find moral hazard in Iran insurance market. Also, the intensity of this 
phenomenon in different insurance categories has been showed in table 6.   
 
Table 6. The distribution results of elasticity in different insurance category Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
6 5 4 3 2 1 Insurance category 
0.0864(0.000) 0.24(0.000) 0.1843(0.000) 0.1013(0.000) 0.0855(0.000) 0.1265(0.000) 0 
0.1229(0.000) 0.1205(0.000) 0.0919(0.000) 0.0436(0.012) 0.0516(0.001)  1 
0.1132(0.000) 0.1658(0.000) 0.1113(0.000) 0.0347(0.103)   2 
0.0943(0.000) 0.1528(0.000) 0.1202(0.000)    3 
0.2025(0.000)  0.0685(0.079)     4 
0.2353(0.000)      5 
Insurance categories: 0= uninsured, 1= Employee-employer, 2=Self-insured, 3=officially- insured, 4= Rural-insured, 5= other 
public institution, 6= Supplementary.  
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4. Discussion 
Asymmetric Information is one of the major issues of insurance. This phenomenon, which is marked by its two 
outcomes i.e. moral hazard and adverse selection, can greatly influence inflation and rise health care costs 
(Bajari et al., 2006; Haddad & Anbaji, 2010; Liu et al., 2012). Neglecting this problem can lead to the 
bankruptcy of insurance organizations and push them out of the market.  
In this study, despite the heterogeneity in households’ health status, a semi- parametric approach was used to 
estimate the parameters of the utility function of the demand for outpatient services. As ߛଵ and ߛଷ parameters 
of utility function showed, household are more risk averse in the consumption of medical services compared 
with other goods and services and they are more inclined to consume more of these services; it is consistent with 
the results of studies by Bajari et al. and Keshavarz. Also, ߛଶ that represents the significance and weight of 
medical services consumption is in line with the results of the mentioned studies. However, its values are much 
higher than that of previous studies which indicates that in recent years, people has paid more attention to the 
consumption of medical services. Common to all these studies, households put more emphasis on the use of 
medical services. Consistent with other studies, the Arro-Part risk aversion index showed that people with higher 
incomes are less risk averse than other people. 
Households’ health status also showed that households covered by rural insurance - although paid nothing 
premium and their premiums were paid by the government- had better health status; and, people who were under 
the coverage of supplementary insurance had the worst health status. Nevertheless, Bajari’s study in the USA 
showed that self-insured people had better health status and individuals covered by Medicare who government 
paid for their health insurance had the worst health status. A study by Keshavarz, which was conducted in 2010, 
showed that employee- employer insured and officially-insured households had the best health status (Bajari et 
al., 2006; Haddad & Anbaji, 2010). 
 The results of conditional Kolmogorov-Smirnov test showed that, contrary to uninsured people, all insurance 
classes had a significant difference in terms of latent health status; thus the presence of adverse selection 
phenomenon was proved in all groups, except for the rural insured individuals.  
But it is obvious that the intensity of this phenomenon varies in different classes of insurance. This outcome is 
less observed in employee-employer insured people who are covered by the Social Security Organization (SSO) 
whose insurance is compulsory. On the other hand, the severity of adverse selection was higher among the 
self-insured people covered by this organization (SSO), which suggests that this insurance category has worse 
health status in comparison with the compulsory insured people. This point indicates they have more information 
about their health status than their insurer, and they apply for insurance when alarmed so that to use the 
insurance benefits. Hence, to prevent adverse selection, the Social Security Organization should utilize more 
appropriate mechanisms to insure the people who are voluntarily trying to buy insurance. Moreover, other 
insurance organizations and public institutions regarding to health status of their insured people, must utilize the 
appropriate screening mechanisms to focus on and evaluate the risk status of insured people and they have to 
identify high risk individuals. 
According to the results, people who had supplementary insurance had showed the highest level of adverse 
selection; the result is consistent with that of Mahdavi et al.’s study (Gh Mahdavi & Izadi, 2012). Although 
various insurance companies provide supplementary insurance for groups of people, the individuals are not 
forced to choose this type of insurance. Thus, according to the results, people who chose this type of insurance 
had worse health status, compared with the other insured groups. 
To test moral hazard, price elasticity was compared in couples of insurance groups. According to the results of 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, this phenomenon was confirmed and the null hypothesis suggesting the absence of 
this phenomenon was rejected. The result was in line with the results of Kang, Marquis and Pylypchuk that 
showed people who have health insurance are more sensitive to changes in the amount of reimbursable by the 
insurance institutions (Kang et al., 2009; Marquis & Phelps, 1987; Pylypchuk, 2010). Due to the elasticity of 
medical expenses to the reimbursed rate, if the reimbursed rate reduces by insurance institutions, the level of 
moral hazard among insured people will decrease more intensely and the insured people will have to take more 
precaution activities. Although people with supplementary insurance had the worst health status among the other 
insured groups, they had less intense moral hazard than the other insured households. It suggests that the 
mentioned insurance institution had a better mechanism for controlling and changing the consumption behaviors.  
5. Conclusion 
The presence of these two phenomena in the health insurance market leads to the provision of inadequate health 
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services, lack of adequate coverage of services, and delay in reimbursements by insurers. It will result in the 
dissatisfaction of insured, insurer and providers. So, considering these outcomes in health insurance market, 
insurance organizations should be informed about the risk status of their insured people via more exact screening 
tests. Also, it is necessary for actuaries to determine the appropriate premium for reimbursement of unexpected 
loss. Then, they have to make policy and enact insurance laws like deductible to oblige insured people to take 
more precautionary activities and change their consumption behavior so that they control the high burden of 
medical expenses resulting from moral hazard. 
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